

Chapter 9

Political Recruitment in an Executive-Centric System: Presidents, Ministers, and Governors in Brazil

Timothy J. Power¹
Marilia G. Mochel

Given its enormous size, its status as the world's third largest democracy, and its permissive, high-magnitude electoral system, Brazil is a world leader in the production of candidates for elective office. Many of those candidates, however, seek offices that they neither care for nor plan to hold for very long. Legislative life is often disdained, and executive office is supremely valued. This simple observation is confirmed by both behavioral and attitudinal data.

Behaviorally, the preferred pathways to power in Brazil can be inferred from the strategic choices that politicians make. In the quadrennial municipal elections, typically 20 to 25 percent of the membership of the National Congress will choose to run for the mayoralty of one of Brazil's more than 5500 municipalities. Compare this to the United States, where in the entire country there are probably fewer than five cities that might attract a sitting member of Congress to throw his or her hat into a mayor's race. The scramble for mayoralties is a revealing datum for political scientists: even without being asked which office they prefer, a quarter of federal deputies are obviously voting with their feet.

Attitudinally, when politicians do respond to surveys, a similar pattern emerges. A survey statement that "In general, it is better to hold a position in the executive branch than a seat in Congress," was agreed to by some 73% of a sample of 158 federal legislators in 1997. When the question was repeated in the subsequent legislature in 2001, some 66% of 137 respondents agreed.² In unstructured interviews about career preferences, it usually does not take long to uncover the reasoning behind these views. "Politics is all about hiring and firing," legislators say. "Every politician wants to control a budget" is another typically wistful comment about life in the executive branch. "The deputy is forever asking someone else to do something for his

¹ The authors would like to thank Joy Langston, Scott Morgenstern, Edson Nunes, and Peter Siavelis for helpful comments on an earlier version of this chapter.

² The statement was worded as: "*Em geral, ocupar um cargo executivo é melhor do que ter um mandato parlamentar.*" In each survey, about half of the respondents had held executive office and half had not, and there was no statistically significant difference in the rates of agreement—in fact, agreement was almost identical across the two groups. From mail questionnaires administered by Power in both houses of Congress in 1997 and 2001.

strongholds. His dream is not to have to ask anymore.” In a political system characterized by poverty, inequality, patron-client relations, and a strong sense of *imediatismo político*—the idea that problems must be solved yesterday—“you can’t even compare” political service in the legislative and executive branches.³ Executives—not legislators—can make a difference in the lives of ordinary voters, and politicians know this. The bottom line is that political ambition in the Brazilian political system reflects the strongly executive-centric nature of politics (Samuels 2003).

At the pinnacle of executive power stands the president of the Republic, the dominant figure in Brazilian politics. Arrayed behind the president in Brasília are the two dozen or so *ministros de Estado* who control policy and purse strings in various domains of government output: health, transportation, agriculture, finance. At the subnational level, executive power accrues to the 27 state governors (until 1930, revealingly called “presidents”) who are the chief executives of what are essentially hyperpresidential mini-political systems. The governors are surrounded by their own “ministers,” known as *secretários estaduais*, many of whom are technocrats who will eventually use their state-level executive portfolios to launch political careers. At the municipal level, the pattern is replicated identically with *prefeitos* (mayors) and *secretários municipais*. There is a clear hierarchy of the more than five thousand mayoralties: the chief executives of the 26 state capitals are powerful political figures in their states, second only to their governors, and there are close to 200 other large cities in Brazil whose mayors exert great influence as well. This hierarchy of power is reflected in the Constitution: only cities with more than 200,000 voters have mayoral runoff elections, while the others, considered less politically important, use first-past-the-post rules. Moreover, in another nod to executive power, any federal legislator who is invited to serve as a *secretário estadual* or as a *secretário municipal* of a capital city is allowed to take a leave from Congress and later return to his/her seat (at any given moment, two or three dozen members of Congress are enjoying this privilege). This roster of executive positions largely corresponds to what politicians aspire to achieve (Samuels 2003: 16-23). Arguably, we may also add to this list the “number twos” (the vice-president, the vice-

³ From interviews conducted by Power with federal legislators in 1990 and 1993. See Power (2000), chapter 6.

governors, and the vice-mayors), since under Brazilian law the *vices* will almost always have a chance to exercise executive power—some for up to six months in a four-year term.⁴

Given the critical importance of executives in Brazilian politics, it is essential to uncover their pathways to power—who are they, where do they come from, and how are they chosen? For the greater part of this chapter, executive recruitment is treated as a dependent variable. But as the editors of this volume point out, political recruitment should also be conceived of as an independent variable. To avoid consigning recruitment to the category of “a cause in search of an effect,” we try to identify some political consequences of distinct pathways to power. We examine three types of executive office: the presidency, ministerial portfolios, and state governorships. Municipal mayors are excluded not for lack of relevance but due simply to a lack of data: there is no central information source on the more than 5,500 territorial units and executive incumbents. Exclusion of municipal executives is a shortcoming that we and others should endeavor to rectify soon, given the centrality of *prefeitos* in Brazilian political life.

Our main arguments can be summarized briefly. As the editors of this volume point out, the presidency presents an obvious analytical problem due to the small-*N* nature of the office. However, despite personal idiosyncrasies of presidents and some caveats relating to partisan factors, we find that a number of contemporary Brazilian presidents can be adequately classified according to the taxonomy of executive types devised by the editors. Turning to cabinet ministers, we find that *ministros* are recruited in accordance with political factors and technocratic qualifications, with the actual weighting of these factors depending largely on time and on the political challenges of constructing a pro-presidential majority in Congress. Finally, with regard to state governors, we find that several of the institutional variables identified by Siavelis and Morgenstern in the introduction to this volume—particularly electoral rules and the timing and sequencing of elections—shape recruitment to the governorship in important ways. The sequencing of elections in Brazil’s transition to democracy magnified the power of governors; the use of double-ballot majoritarian rules encourages a large number of candidacies; and the concurrence of gubernatorial and presidential elections means that governors are critical to coalition building and governability. Partisan variables matter as well, but we argue that the editors’ one-size-fits-all taxonomy of executive types needs to be “stretched” in order to

⁴ The seconds-in-command formally assume power whenever the chief executive travels outside the jurisdiction. Also, some incumbent executives (although not the president or vice-president) are required to temporarily stand down while seeking reelection or election to other offices.

accommodate the critical distinction between catch-all and ideological parties (Mainwaring 1999) as well as the remarkable regional diversity of Brazil's subnational units (Soares 1967, Cintra 1979). Regional factors are often as important as partisan variables in shaping overall patterns of recruitment to the governorship.

We deal with presidents, ministers, and governors in turn, with the majority of the analysis given over to the enormously important state governors. We then proceed to our conclusions.

1. Recruitment to the Presidency

Brazil became a republic in 1889. Since then, eleven individuals have held the title of president under democratic conditions. Of these, only ten have actually served (one died before assuming office) and only eight were actually elected to the presidency (three acceded from the vice presidency). As of 2005, only three democratically elected presidents have successfully concluded their terms and handed over power to a successor also chosen in free elections. The first two times this happened (in 1950 and 1960) the successor himself did not complete his term; the third attempt—begun with the transition from Cardoso to Lula in 2002—is now under way. Since the modern period of presidential elections began in 1989, there have been fewer than twenty serious candidacies across the four electoral cycles, and only eight persons have ever won more than 10% of the first-round vote for president.⁵ Clearly, the Brazilian presidency has not had patterns of candidate selection and succession that would allow us to derive empirically based generalizations about pathways to the office. Nonetheless, some general observations can be made.

First, prior executive experience matters in presidential recruitment. As Table 1 shows, all but one modern presidents have previously served as minister, governor, or mayor. Goulart made his name during a brief stint at the Labor Ministry under Vargas, and Cardoso launched his successful presidential campaign from the Finance Ministry. Many have been governors of important states (Vargas, Quadros, Neves), although governors of less developed states have also projected themselves politically (Collor, Sarney). Excepting Dutra, who was War Minister during the Second World War, all modern presidents have served in the National Congress—but

⁵ The eight individuals are Fernando Collor (PRN, 1989), Lula (PT, 1989, 1994, 1998, 2002), Leonel Brizola (PDT, 1989), Mário Covas (PSDB, 1989), Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB, 1994, 1998), Ciro Gomes (PPS, 1998, 2002), Anthony Garotinho (PSB, 2002), and José Serra (PSDB, 2002).

it would be difficult to make the case that legislative service was decisive as a springboard for any of them. Cardoso is the only “insider legislator” to have been elected president, but this occurred only after he was magnified by the Finance portfolio in 1993-1994. The only modern president with no prior executive experience in government is the incumbent, Lula, although his supporters point out that he has run both a labor union and a political party.

[TABLE 1]

Second, electoral rules governing presidential nomination are lenient. Although Brazilian law does not permit independent candidacies, it has also been very permissive regarding the creation of new parties. Nomination by a legally recognized party, therefore, is not much of an obstacle to presidential aspirants. The successful candidacy of Fernando Collor in 1989 is perhaps the best-known example of a party (the PRN) being created uniquely for the purpose of a single presidential bid, although there are many minor examples. Candidates are usually selected in national conventions in which both federal legislators and regional elites (e.g., governors and mayors) have influence. Of the major parties, only the PT has used a presidential primary—once, in 2002. But since the only such primary was won by Lula with more than 80% of the vote, we cannot say that primaries have had any impact yet on presidential candidate selection in Brazil.

In the current democracy, the permissiveness of nomination rules has led to 23 candidacies in 1989, eight in 1994, twelve in 1998, and six in 2002, although only about a third of these candidacies could generously be considered realistic. The unusually high number of candidates in 1989 is best explained by two factors: first, pent-up demand in the context of a “founding election” (this was the first direct presidential contest since 1960), and second, the lack of concurrence with other races. Beginning in 1994, presidential and legislative elections were made concurrent, and they also coincide with gubernatorial and state assembly elections. This has forced major parties to coordinate their national and subnational alliance formation with greater care, leading to a smaller effective number of presidential candidates than one might otherwise expect.

Whereas in 1989 each of the major parties ran its own candidate in the first round, each of the subsequent three contests saw some large (e.g., PMDB and PFL) and medium-sized (e.g., PDT, PTB, PL) parties stepping aside and supplying vice-presidential candidates to other parties in pre-election alliances. In 1989 the vice-presidency was an afterthought to most parties

(fatefully, as it turns out, since Collor's running mate, Itamar Franco, later became president), but since 1994 ticket balancing has become increasingly important in national politics. In 1994, for example, the PFL clearly believed that it was better to take part in a viable alliance and have power in the subsequent administration than to run a candidate with no real chance of winning—thus the PFL, and the PTB as well, allied with Cardoso's PSDB. Also in 1994, the PT and PDT formed the “dream ticket” of the left, Lula and Leonel Brizola (a pairing that might have won in 1989), but they were easily defeated by Cardoso. Cardoso's two-time running mate, Marco Maciel (PFL) was chosen for regional balance, while José Serra's (PSDB) running mate in 2002, Rita Camata (PMDB), was chosen for gender and charisma. Lula's running mate in 2002, the wealthy businessman and senator José de Alencar of the center-right Liberal Party, was chosen more for his symbolic value as an *empresário* than for the small electoral organization he brought into the PT's fold.

The effective number of presidential candidates may decline yet again due to a new legal principle known as “verticalization.” A 1996 electoral law stipulated that political parties must have “national character.” In a surprise decision in 2002, Brazil's electoral management board (*Tribunal Superior Eleitoral* or TSE) interpreted this mandate as meaning that parties could not have alliances in the states that were different from their alliance at the national level (for president). The unexpected imposition of consistent interparty alliances—known as *verticalização* in Brazilian parlance—radically changed the way parties do business. Unless the TSE reverses its decision, henceforth only parties with real chances at the presidency are likely to field presidential candidates or make formal alliances with candidates nominated by other parties. Otherwise, they may prefer to stay out of presidential politics in order to maximize their chances at the subnational level, where they are more viable. The PFL and PPB, for example, chose not to ally with any of the major candidates in 2002, while other parties chose informal or subtle support for established candidates so as not to run afoul of the law. Many parties view *verticalização* as an unacceptable straitjacket and the controversy is sure to work its way through the legal system.

The foregoing observations are cautionary, since they tell us that the effective number of presidential candidacies cannot be inferred automatically from electoral rules. Both the permissiveness of nomination procedures (Mainwaring 1999) and the existence of a double-ballot majoritarian system (Jones 1999) should predict a very high number of candidacies in

Brazil. But the need for parties to engage in alliances has led to ticket balancing, and the decision of the TSE to enforce party building through consistent alliances has tied the hands of the Brazilian selectorate. To paraphrase a hero of the current ruling party, parties nominate their presidential candidates, but they do not do so under conditions of their own choosing.

Most of the postwar presidential candidates and winners can be classified using the typology developed by Siavelis and Morgenstern for this volume. Despite Brazil's reputation for loose parties, a surprisingly large number of aspirants can be viewed as *party insiders*. In the 1950s, both Juscelino Kubitschek (PSD) and João Goulart (PTB) fit the mold, although the latter never actually ran for president. We add to Siavelis and Morgenstern's framework the hypothesis that *party insiders* are particularly prone to compete in "founding elections." Thus the first round in 1989 was overcrowded with party insiders: Lula (PT), Brizola (PDT), Ulysses Guimarães (PMDB), Paulo Maluf (PDS), Aureliano Chaves (PFL), Mário Covas (PSDB), and Roberto Freire (PCB) were the dominant figures in their parties at the time. *Party adherents* have also been common. In 1998, Ciro Gomes, a new recruit to the PPS (formerly PCB), became a star votegetter for a previously marginal party, and in 2002, the same occurred with Anthony Garotinho, a recent adherent to the PSB who went on to win an impressive 18% for a party that had traditionally been a minor satellite of the PT. Again in contrast to Brazil's reputation in the literature, the number of *free-wheeling independents* (FWIs) has been rather small at the presidential level. Jânio Quadros in 1960 and Fernando Collor in 1989 both ran as anti-party populists, with Quadros borrowing the UDN label and Collor creating his own PRN party.

Consistent with its long history of corporatist representation (Power and Doctor 2004), Brazil has also seen its fair share of *group agents*. In 1989, conservative landowner Ronaldo Caiado ran on the PSD label as the candidate of the Rural Democratic Union (UDR), a hardline group opposed to agrarian reform (Payne 2000). The same year, Fernando Gabeira competed as the candidate of the tiny Green Party (PV). Gabeira's was not a partisan campaign but rather a proxy candidacy for the environmental movement, which hoped only to influence the larger parties. Finally, in both 1994 and 1998 retired military officers (Adm. Hernani Fortuna and Gen. Ivan Frota, respectively) ran as corporate representatives of the armed forces and symbols of authoritarian nostalgia. None of these *group agents* had much difficulty in securing a party nomination and filing for candidacy. In doing so, they were able to take advantage of the legal

provision that provides for free television time for all candidates. Even the most resource-poor special interest groups in Brazil can gain some media visibility by running *group agents* in elections.

Following the framework of Morgenstern and Siavelis, we now reverse our focus and examine presidential recruitment as an independent variable. How well do these candidate types work as predictors of electoral and postelectoral behavior in Brazil? FWIs, whose campaigns are usually assaults on established parties, should be expected to be erratic and unpredictable after election, and this corresponds to the reality of Quadros and Collor. Both ran on the same main issue: corruption. Neither finished his term, leaving Brazil with two unelected presidents, Goulart and Itamar Franco. Group agents in Brazil have not proven viable. Party adherents have campaigned in accordance with Siavelis and Morgenstern's predictions, downplaying ideology and stressing vague and broad themes. Both Ciro in 1998 and Garotinho in 2002, for example, were extremely reluctant either to define their adopted parties ideologically or to stress their personal continuities with elements of the parties' pasts.

We make a special caution regarding the predictive capacity of *party insider* in Brazil. Although candidacies of this type have been frequent, the need to forge both electoral alliances and post-election governing alliances imply that partisanship will be a poor predictor of behavior both on the campaign trail and in government. Consider the last three presidential contests, which have largely been fought between the same two parties (PT and PSDB) and their unambiguously insider nominees (Lula, Cardoso, and Serra). In 1994, Cardoso's preelection alliance with the conservative PFL marked a sharp break with the historically social democratic identity of the PSDB. Given his need to form an effective multiparty alliance, Cardoso was willing to accept the dilution of his ideology, and both campaigned and governed from the center (Power 2001-2002). Serra had to make similar concessions to the heterogeneous and unwieldy PMDB in 2002. Lula's 2002 campaign was the first in which the PT made alliances outside of the left, and it was also the first election that the party won. His remarkable pragmatism in his first two years in government moved the PT rightward, much as the PSDB in the 1990s and the PMDB in the 1980s. Thus, the political requisites of coalition building severely limit the extent to which partisanship and ideology can be used to predict the behavior of aspirants and presidents.

2. Recruitment to Ministerial Office

In his study of the political ambition of Brazilian federal legislators, Samuels (2003) discusses the country's political "opportunity structure." Following Black's (1972) and Rohde's (1979) propositions, he seeks to define the political opportunity structure based on three factors: (1) the relative benefits of each office, (2) the costs associated with winning and holding each office, and (3) the probability of winning each office. The office benefits that the author is looking at include: pay and other perquisites, the size of the budget the office controls, the ability to influence policy, the patronage opportunities attached to the office, the length of the term, and the reelection and advancement potential. Samuels' investigation of the benefits associated with each office creates a career ladder where ministerial and gubernatorial offices are at the top, as the most attractive positions. In this brief section we examine ministers, and in the next section we give more extended attention to governors.

Samuels notes that "a governorship offers more benefits than a seat in the Chamber (or the Senate), but it remains unclear whether it ranks higher than a ministry" (2003: 20). Amorim Neto (2002) also grapples with this question, but in his analysis of cabinet formation he is ultimately forced to model all portfolios as having equal value. Table 2, however, suggests that federal legislators attach wildly different values to ministries. When asked to name the most important ministry for their state or region in 1990, about half of legislators cited either Agriculture or Interior—neither of which have the sort of prestige associated with Finance or Foreign Relations and both of which are routinely filled by forgettable ministers. The Agriculture, Interior, Education, and Transportation portfolios are all ideal for public works and for trading in favors, but many other ministries have little value to individual deputies (though they may have more perceived value to parties).⁶ Not all ministries are created equal, but more research is necessary to devise a precise weighting of their political worth.

[TABLE 2]

Recruitment to the federal cabinet has changed in important ways in the postwar period. Fortunately, we are able to build on the excellent study by Edson Nunes (1978), who collected data on 227 ministers in civilian portfolios between 1946 and 1977. His intent was to compare ministerial recruitment in the democracy of 1946-64 with the post-1964 military dictatorship.

⁶ See Ames (2001) for a discussion of the relationship between individual deputies and cabinet ministers.

Updating his work, we have added data on 109 ministers in the Cardoso and Lula administrations since 1995. The results are presented in Table 3.

The most important change in the postwar period has been the fluctuation in the percentage of ministers with “political” backgrounds. Here we define a political background as prior service in the National Congress or a state legislature. In the 1946-64 democracy, about 60% of ministers were recruited from legislative backgrounds. As Nunes pointed out in 1978, this percentage fell *by half* during the military regime (Table 3). The sharp drop illustrated both the military’s technocratic approach to development and its mistrust of professional politicians. Our extension of Nunes shows that since the return of democracy in the 1980s, the percentage of ministers drawn from legislative life has indeed increased, although not to the levels visible prior to the 1964 coup. Only 44% of 109 ministers between 1995 and 2003 could be classified as having a legislative background, although this figure conceals a major difference between the cabinets of Lula (more political) and Cardoso (more technocratic). More than one-third of all Cardoso ministers (34 of 88) came from technical or bureaucratic backgrounds.

[TABLE 3]

Our first point about ministerial recruitment is therefore that politicians may have less automatic access to the cabinet than they did in the past. Admittedly, this could be an artifact of the Cardoso period (Lula’s 62.5% political cabinet is on par with pre-coup levels),⁷ but there are persuasive reasons why presidents may be increasingly tempted to employ technocrats in the future. One is an older, secular trend toward specialization of state functions and the growing importance of “technocratic roles” in government, which O’Donnell (1973) memorably cited as a key facet of modernization in Latin America. Another is a newer trend: the intense pressures of economic globalization. Latin American presidents increasingly make policy and appointments with an eye focused externally on “the markets” rather than internally on party politics: this favors apolitical *técnicos* for key jobs. Conversely, when state reforms are urgently prescribed, professional politicians may actually prefer that these reforms be carried out by technocrats rather than assume the responsibility for themselves or their parties.⁸ (Technocrats

⁷ The large number of ex-legislators in Lula’s first cabinet is understandable given the PT’s history. Founded in 1980, the PT did not win the presidency until 2002. By the time it arrived to power, it had a long political “waiting list”—there were more than 100 former deputies and senators who had never held a cabinet portfolio and who formed the initial talent pool for Lula.

⁸ Political concerns often tie the hands of presidents in this regard. One interpretation of Brazil’s severe electricity crisis in 2001 was that the Ministry of Mines and Energy had become ineffective during its long period partisan

are disposable, as the economist Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira has discovered twice.) The choice between “technocrats or politicians” is of course unappealing to presidents, since state reforms need both solid technical formulation and solid political backing.

Our second point about ministerial recruitment concerns what happens to the ministries that do remain within the domain of party politics. Democratic Brazil operates under a situation of permanent minority presidentialism. Given one of the most fragmented party systems in the world, it is almost a certainty that the Brazilian president will never control a majority of the seats in Congress.⁹ Given the mathematics of Congressional support, Brazilian presidents must behave like European prime ministers: they must fashion multiparty cabinets and multiparty voting blocs on the floor of the legislature. Abranches (1988) gave this system an apt name: *presidencialismo de coalizão*, or coalitional presidentialism. The game of *presidencialismo de coalizão* means that ministries are awarded to parties—and withdrawn from them—on the basis of loyalty to the president. However, parties have some negotiating power with presidents, sometimes forcing presidents to accept ministers that they had not originally considered for the portfolios.¹⁰ Large parties that can deliver lots of floor votes are particularly demanding, as Lula discovered when he invited the PMDB to join his government in late 2003. Meneguello (1998) has shed light on the importance of these negotiations, and Amorim Neto (2002) has shown empirically that from the president’s perspective, *presidencialismo de coalizão* actually “works” in the sense that executives can indeed expect higher coalition discipline when they compose their cabinets wisely.

Amorim Neto’s cogent analysis of cabinet management lead us to hypothesize that that candidate type, as outlined in the editors’ introduction to this volume, is an important intervening variable in coalitional presidentialism. *Party insiders* arriving to the presidency, for example Cardoso, will instinctively seek out legislative interlocutors with similar insider backgrounds,

control by the PFL, which stretched back through several administrations. When the crisis hit in mid-2001, Cardoso maintained the PFL minister (Rodolpho Tourinho) in office, but transferred effective control of the energy crisis to a technocrat, Pedro Parente.

⁹ Cardoso’s PSDB never held more than 21% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies in the 1995-2002 period, while currently Lula’s PT controls only 18% of the seats in the lower house.

¹⁰ An instructive example occurred in 1993. The tiny PTR and PSC parties had no presence in Itamar Franco’s cabinet, but concluded that by joining forces they could make a case for a portfolio. The parties therefore joined together to form the PP, which by virtue of its larger size successfully demanded the Ministry of Agriculture. Itamar accepted the name of the unknown person they nominated for the post, only to find out a week later that this individual (Nuri Andraus) had been indicted for murder in his home state. Needless to say, he was invited to leave, although the new PP eventually maintained its presence in the cabinet.

thus facilitating the negotiations that lead to mutually satisfactory cabinets. Cardoso's choice of another consummate insider (Marco Maciel) as his vice president was no accident: their joint capacity for partisan dealmaking was unparalleled in recent Brazilian history. But *free-wheeling independents* do not speak the same language as *party insiders*: FWIs are unlikely to have much prior experience or subsequent success in the complex negotiations that are necessary to keep party leaders satisfied and maintain a functioning coalition on the floor of Congress. Collor's studied disdain for party leaders in his 1989 campaign was maintained throughout his short and disastrous presidency, and even his ostensible supporters in Congress refused to defend him when he ran afoul of the law in 1992 (Weyland 1993).¹¹ Revealingly, Collor's terminal cabinet had to be padded with technocrats and nonpartisans. Candidate type matters, but in the end *presidencialismo de coalizão* makes it difficult to develop a predictive theory of ministerial recruitment in Brazil, since the awarding of the "political" portfolios largely reflects the ins and outs of coalitions and the ups and downs of executive-legislative relations.

Therefore, the most we can say about ministerial recruitment at present is that it seems to respond partly to mounting technocratic pressures and more clearly to presidents' short-term need to keep their coalitions intact. But when we view ministerial office as an independent variable, it is clear that a well-placed ministry is an excellent launching pad to a state governorship or even to a presidential bid, as Cardoso, Serra, and Ciro Gomes have shown in recent years.

3. Recruitment to the Governorship

Of the three executive offices we are examining here, the governorship is the most promising for analytical purposes. Governors provide us with a far higher *N* than presidents, and the position of governors as intermediaries between presidents and legislators is highly revealing of macropolitical process in Brazil (Abrucio 1998). Not only state-level politics but also elections to the National Congress are largely organized around gubernatorial campaigns (Samuels 2003, chap. 5).

We begin this section with a simple assumption about the goals of Brazilian politicians: the governorship is extraordinarily attractive in Brazil, and virtually all politicians except active

¹¹ We believe that Collor's status as a FWI is the dominant factor explaining his poor management of executive-legislative relations. However, an institutional factor was also at work: Collor's victory in a nonconcurrent election in 1989 may have led him to claim a larger mandate than he would have otherwise.

presidential candidates want to be governor. We then introduce two key variables that explain the selection of gubernatorial candidates. First, characteristics of the political party system in Brazil shape the recruitment process. The differentiation between left-wing and catch-all parties, emphasized recently by Mainwaring (1999), is paramount. Second, given the provincial character of the parties, environmental characteristics of subnational political systems are also critical. Recruitment of gubernatorial candidates can be starkly different between oligarchic states and more plural ones. After discussing these two variables, we turn to the consequences of the selection processes for politicians' behavior. What are the recurrent patterns of candidate selection across state borders in a very decentralized political system? Adapting the Siavelis and Morgenstern framework, we develop four ideal types of politicians who win nominations for governor: party insiders, proxies of party bosses, oligarchical proxies, and independents searching for a party label.

The nature of state governorships. Observers of the Brazilian political scene have traditionally cited governors as immensely powerful players. Given this longstanding interpretation, the attractiveness of the governorship could almost be described as a constant rather than a variable—except that the mode of democratic transition in Brazil in the 1980s actually magnified the importance of subnational politics.

Abrucio (1998) asserts that Brazilian politicians have their careers defined by politics in their home states. The electoral system strongly connects individual politicians to the dynamics of politics at the state level: first, because federal deputies are elected via proportional representation in a statewide district,¹² and second, because senatorial and gubernatorial races are majoritarian contests at the state level. He claims that the political system that emerged from the democratic transition and that was consolidated in the 1988 Constitution is characterized by a “state-oriented federalism” (*federalismo estadualista*) and a “state-level ultrapresidentialism” (*ultrapresidencialismo estadual*). State-level ultrapresidentialism refers to the fact that governors exert power with few of the checks and balances peculiar to republicanism. State-oriented federalism points to the powerful position governorships were granted with the decentralization of power that marked redemocratization, coupled with their ability to command the votes of state delegates to Congress.

¹² Although the bulk of votes for a federal deputy may very often constitute what Ames (2001) calls “informal districts,” governors have used state largesse to assist other candidates in the *redutos* of deputies that did not ally with them. Abrucio (1998) noted the same pattern regarding the *redutos* of state-level deputies.

Abrucio's argument rests partly on the political sequencing of democratic transition. The first free gubernatorial elections (in 1982 and 1986) took place before the first direct presidential elections in Brazil (1989). Therefore, other races, and the political system more generally, had already been organized around the state-level contests. Mayors and state deputies became highly dependent on gubernatorial support in elections. The weakness of political parties is both a cause and a consequence of this phenomenon. Governors exercise virtually unchallenged authority within state borders (Abrucio 1998), given that Brazilian state assemblies are highly reactive rather than proactive.

Supporting Abrucio's propositions, Samuels (2003) concludes that gubernatorial coattails are more important for federal deputies than are the dynamics of the presidential contest. Given the weakness of political parties in campaigns, piggybacking on the gubernatorial nominee offers congressional candidates the personal label of the statewide candidate, the resources of a larger contest, and greater media exposure. Consequently, federal deputies become dependent on the state-level executive for their career opportunities, and therefore display a great deal of loyalty to the governor while in Congress. Since gubernatorial coattails drive elections, parties have an incentive to nominate strong political candidates for governorships. Or, as we will see below, established bosses sometimes try to transfer their political prestige to more obscure nominees.

Recall that gubernatorial contests are majoritarian elections. Differently from the pattern under open-list PR, majoritarian contests require that candidates have broad appeal in order to carry the state. Like presidential candidates, gubernatorial aspirants normally have to construct multiparty coalitions. Candidates should also possess the statewide name recognition usually afforded by longer political careers. Thus, over time, the percentage of governors with prior service in the legislative branch—signifying that they are not political “outsiders”—has remained high. Our extension of Nunes' (1978) research shows that ex-legislators provided 69% of governors in the democratic 1946-1962 period, 64% under the military regime in 1965-1974, and an astounding 78% in the democratic elections from 1986 through 2002 (Table 4). A comparison of Tables 3 and 4 illustrates a key point made by Nunes about the military regime: while the generals downgraded the importance of professional politicians in the national cabinet, they did not do so in state-level politics. The military needed established elites to help them govern the provinces. In today's democracy, four out of five governors have served in the state assembly or national legislature, making them political insiders and familiar faces to voters.

[TABLE 4]

Partisan factors in recruitment. The under-institutionalization of the Brazilian party system is amply documented, and we will not revisit those arguments in this space. For our purposes here, we need borrow only two propositions from this literature: the crucial differences between catch-all and ideological parties (Mainwaring 1999) and the overall decentralization of the party system.

Mainwaring finds that politicians in catch-all parties believe that their electoral success rests more on their individual efforts than on the party label. In addition, the internal heterogeneity of catch-all parties blurs the importance of party labels. Parties play an insignificant role in campaigns: candidates have to run on their own. In catch-all parties, financing campaigns depends on individual candidates. Given the free-agent style of campaigning, candidates present little allegiance to the party once they are elected. Party switching is rampant. Party organizations are so weak that they all but vanish in the period between elections (Mainwaring 1999: 162-5).

As a consequence, Abrucio notes, “oftentimes the parties depend more on the candidates than the candidates on the parties” (1998: 176). Given the dynamics of open-list PR, parties work to recruit politicians who are proven votegetters (*puxadores de votos*). As a precaution, in legislative elections they may also recruit minor figures to provide descriptive and corporatist representation to different social groups: in the language of Siavelis and Morgenstern, these are often *group delegates* whose role it is to “vacuum up” whatever votes remain unclaimed. Gubernatorial coattails serve to line up politicians according to intra-state cleavages instead of national, programmatic party agendas (Abrucio and Samuels 2000).

Mainwaring deals mainly with catch-all parties because they dominate the party system in Brazil, but goes on to show that leftist parties behave quite differently. First, politicians in left-wing organizations see the party label as more important than their personal efforts in the campaign. In stark contrast to catch-all parties, left parties have been able to mobilize grassroots groups to keep the party organization running between elections. These organizations are more cohesive and therefore voters attach more value to the party label. Donations traditionally are channeled through the party rather than through individual candidates. Obviously, these features strengthen the party to the detriment of the personalism that characterizes catch-all organizations,

meaning that left-wing candidates are more likely to be *party loyalists* in Siavelis' and Morgenstern's terms.

The PT is the best example of an ideological party, and is also the only large party of this type. The PT has traditionally had stringent rules regarding candidate nominations. Unlike the catch-all parties, the PT does not have an "open admissions" policy and therefore does not attract politicians looking for a "party to rent" (*legenda de aluguel*). The party requires that candidates be members of the organization since December 15 of the year prior to the election, make the appropriate financial contributions to the organization, and sign the party principles agreement (Guzmán and Oliveira 2001). In nominating gubernatorial candidates, the PT has traditionally picked the names by consensus within the state-level *diretórios*. Reflecting its commitment to internal democracy, when consensus has not proved possible the PT has begun to use primary elections. In 2002, PT primaries were held in five states.¹³ When state conventions are used rather than primaries, they typically ratify decisions already made about the nominations.

Given the PT's uniqueness as an ideological and nationally organized party, we would expect that the PT would be the party most likely to nominate its own candidates rather than back the names offered by others. This is confirmed empirically in Table 5, which presents the partisan affiliations of all 610 candidates state governorships in Brazil between 1990 and 2002. Given that there were 27 states and four electoral cycles, the maximum number of candidates nominated by a single party would be 108. In 81 state-year cases (75% of the time), the PT nominated its own candidate for governor. Only the PMDB comes close, and the PMDB began this period many times larger than the PT. All of the other major catch-all parties nominated gubernatorial candidates at less than half the opportunities, mostly because their alliances are fluid and shifting within and across states. Another clear pattern is that the small parties of the left largely abstained from nominations in favor of the PT, but that nondescript small parties of the right supplied fully one quarter of all gubernatorial candidates in Brazil. Ideology matters because personalism, party-switching, and "open-admissions policies" are rampant on the right.

[TABLE 5]

¹³ In the most notable primary in 2002, two titans of the PT battled one another for the nomination in the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul. Challenger Tarso Genro defeated incumbent governor Olívio Dutra for the PT nomination, only to lose the governorship in the general election. Both losers, Tarso and Olívio, ended up in Lula's cabinet in 2003.

Up to this point, we have seen the differences in the relationship between candidates and parties in two kinds of parties in Brazil. Gubernatorial candidates of catch-all parties run autonomously and, if elected, do not have very many reasons to recognize the authority of the party. This, coupled with the power of their office, serves to make politicians—and consequently parties—more dependent on the governor than the contrary. In contrast, leftist organizations are more important in campaigns via financial contributions and grassroots mobilization. Plus, their labels work more effectively as “short-cuts” to voters. Politicians owe more to the party organization once they are elected. As a result, they tend to be constrained by party directives and thus conform to the “party insider” profile advanced by Siavelis and Morgenstern.

The other aspect of the party system that impacts gubernatorial candidate selection is the decentralization of parties. Although the national organizations of the catch-all parties have some power on paper, the truth is that they barely intervene on state-level issues. All party statutes assign to the state-level organization the task of nominating candidates for governor. Catch-all parties generally do not enforce party discipline because politicians can easily switch parties. Moreover, gubernatorial candidates are granted wide latitude to construct whatever type of alliance that can get them elected. This has created, in the words of Samuels (2003), “a near-total absence of partisan congruence across states.” Samuels draws attention to the problems that Cardoso faced in his 1998 reelection campaign due to the incongruence between his support coalition in the national race and the diverse state-level alliances that backed him as well. Presidential candidates are frequently “disinvited” to campaign rallies within the states because they may aggravate state-level feuds between their national-level supporters.

Once again the PT is the exception. Party principles do delegate a good deal of decisional autonomy to local and state level PT organizations. However, the party also possesses a strong, centralized national executive that is unafraid to overrule subnational party selectorates. In 1998, the state convention of the PT of Rio de Janeiro, then dominated by radicals, nominated Vladimir Palmeira for governor. However, the requirements of the PT’s presidential-level alliance with the PDT required the PT to withdraw its candidate for governor in Rio and supply only a running mate (eventually Benedita da Silva) to the PDT gubernatorial nominee (Anthony Garotinho). The PT of Rio balked. Unflinchingly, the PT national organization intervened in the Rio directorate, overturned the results of the state convention, and quashed Palmeira’s candidacy. Such an action would be unthinkable in any of the other major parties. For the catch-all parties,

there are few means available for the national party to block nominations made at the subnational level.

In sum, recruitment to the governorship varies widely depending on whether candidates emerge within catch-all or disciplined parties. Moreover, the behavior of governors in office is partly a reflection of their partisan affiliation. Governors in catch-all parties are unlikely to answer consistently to their parties. Thus catch-all parties are continually instrumentalized by free-wheeling independents (FWIs).

Oligarchical versus pluralistic states. If looking at differences across parties is one useful way to examine gubernatorial recruitment, another is to look at differences across states. A helpful thought experiment is to conceive of states as approximating one of two ideal-type categories: “oligarchical” and “pluralistic” systems. We do not claim that there are pure examples of either type of state, only that characteristics of each ideal type help us to understand dimensions of gubernatorial recruitment.

Hagopian (1996) describes “traditional politics” as characterized by clientelistic bargains, corruption, personalism, and regionalism in Brazil. She stresses that traditional politics is nondemocratic given power is concentrated in the hands of a few, access to decision making is restricted, channels of political representation are hierarchically arranged, and political competition is strictly regulated. In her study, she notes that there has often been major continuity in regional elites from the military period throughout the democratic regime. In traditional politics systems, political parties are weak; they are merely instruments of oligarchical power.

Abrucio’s study of the governorship illustrates Hagopian’s claims. He warns that rather than view state-level machine politics in partisan terms, it would be more appropriate to see state machines as based on the distribution of favors. Political demands are generally channeled through the executive rather than through political parties. In tracing the impact of such patronage, Mainwaring (1999) notes that the very existence of clientelistic practices undermines popular organizations and political parties. Individuals and popular groups opt for clientelistic deals instead of political mobilization.

According to Mainwaring, clientelism is dearer to local-level politicians and to candidates in PR elections. He asserts that gubernatorial candidates are less dependent on clientelistic bargains since they can rely on television time to appeal directly to voters. However,

it is important to note that television time is awarded according to the performance of parties, not individuals. Thus even if parties are not strong as organizations, controlling state parties is still fundamental to political leaders. Traditionally, politicians have managed to control party organizations via clientelistic exchanges.

One could argue that traditional politics has a foothold in *all* Brazilian states. What we term “oligarchical states” is the group of states whose politics is overwhelmingly controlled by one personal clique. There might be opposition groups in electoral contests, but politics revolves around loyalties to the dominant clan. Even when they lose gubernatorial races, oligarchs are usually able to maintain their political power. A classic example of a system like this would be Bahia, where politics is organized either for or against the family machine of Antônio Carlos Magalhães. The same pivotal role is played by the Sarney family in Maranhão politics, or the Siqueira Campos clan in Tocantins.

Persistent oligarchy is partly the result of the restricted electoral dynamics of the military regime. Clients of the military were able to amass political power in an environment of carefully controlled two-party competition. They received favors from the federal government and spread their influence throughout the state apparatus before the electoral game restarted (Power 2000). The two most renowned cases of personal control of state politics, the Sarneys in Maranhão and the Magalhães in Bahia, can be traced back to shortly after the military coup of 1964. These families doled out political positions and found allies in a variety of public institutions. Also significantly, these families were awarded the control of mass media companies soon after Sarney became president in 1985. Media control came to play a crucial role in politics during and after the transition to democracy (Porto 2003).

On the other hand, in more plural states, the electoral game is not centered on one group. Examples are Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Rio Grande do Sul. Even in these states, bosses can control party machines, but the overall system is more competitive. In oligarchical states, the use of the state machine and the overwhelming concentration of economic and media power casts doubts on the fairness of the electoral game. As in the old Solid South in the U.S., nomination by the machine is often tantamount to election.

Candidate types. In the previous section, we discussed how the attractiveness of the position, differences between the parties, and differences across states shape candidate selection for the Brazilian governorship. We now turn to possible outcomes of the process. For this

purpose, we must modify the Siavelis and Morgenstern taxonomy of candidate types. Their taxonomy is best suited to presidential candidates, who operate in fully nationalized elections in a single electoral district, but key differences across subnational units in Brazil require some modifications to the typology before it can be applied to governors. We thus propose four ideal types of politicians emerging from gubernatorial selection processes: *party insiders*, *insider proxies*, *oligarchy proxies*, and *free-wheeling independents*.

Party insiders are depicted by Siavelis and Morgenstern as politicians who built their careers in the party organization and typically belong to longstanding and institutionalized parties. They add that the party usually has a strong ideological base and therefore its label is important to voters and candidates. These characteristics favor loyalty. The PT of course will always generate such nominees, but even allowing for the overall low levels of party identification in Brazil and the consequently reduced role of party labels in campaigning, it is still possible to identify party insiders in catch-all organizations as well. The immense importance of governorships in the Brazilian political system can force even loosely organized parties to have a reliable candidate at the top of the ticket. For example, even though it became an unambiguously catch-all party in the 1990s, the PSDB was still nominating key insiders such as Aécio Neves (Minas Gerais) and Geraldo Alckmin (São Paulo) to the governorship in 2002. We note that due to the decentralization of parties in Brazil, being a *party insider* at the gubernatorial level does not necessarily mean that the candidate is influential or highly regarded within the national party. It merely means that he/she has control of his/her state party. Some insiders, like Neves, are insiders at both the national and state levels, while others, like Alckmin, are more oriented toward state politics.¹⁴

A good example of a *party insider* at both the national and subnational levels is José Genoíno (PT), a candidate for the governorship of São Paulo in 2002. Genoíno was first elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1982 in the first elections in which the PT participated. He was reelected in 1986, 1990, 1994, and 1998, when he was the most voted-for deputy in high-magnitude São Paulo. As Samuels (2003: 65) notes, he had been elected to Congress solely on the basis of what Brazilians, in a revealing phrase, term the *voto de opinião* (ideological or issue

¹⁴ Alckmin was not much of a national figure prior to 2001, when as vice governor he assumed office upon the death of Mário Covas. The São Paulo PSDB was already crowded with other national luminaries (Cardoso, Serra, Covas, and many influential deputies) so Alckmin was more inwardly focused. However, having been elected on his own merit in 2002 will likely transform him into a national presence.

voting). Loyal, articulate, and unfailingly adaptable to his party's needs, Genoíno lost the 2002 race for governor, but went to the runoff against incumbent Alckmin (PSDB), another candidate of the same type. Confirming his status as insider, Genoíno later became president of the national PT.

Party bosses and their proxies. The control of nominations is dependent on the control of state party delegates. Leaders who control the majority of delegates can make the nominations; they are party bosses. In general, politicians who control party machines have previously held important political positions. They have gained the control of delegates usually due to the favors that their previous position provided. They tend to be skillful politicians.

Until 1998, governors were not permitted consecutive reelection, leaving incumbents in the uncomfortable position of having to find a loyal successor that they could get elected. Oftentimes the proposed successor was supposed just to “keep the seat warm” until the incumbent governor could return four years later, often after a stint in Congress (typically in the Senate, which uses majoritarian rules that favor ex-governors). Although consecutive reelection became possible after 1998, this has not entirely solved the problem of succession, since powerhouse incumbents are still term-limited after one reelection (they can return for a third term after sitting out for four years). Therefore, party bosses at times have picked unknown candidates to run based on the personal prestige of their patron. These are proxy candidacies. When proxy candidates substitute for party bosses, we will call them “insider proxies,” and when they substitute for ruling clans, we term them “oligarchy proxies.” Both result from a process of political grooming and sponsorship known as *apadrinhamento* (from the word for “godfather”).

Abrucio (1998: 145) discusses the interesting case of Orestes Quércia, a PMDB vice-governor of São Paulo who succeeded to the governorship in 1986. In office between 1987 and 1990, Quércia acted like all other governors. He kept the support of local authorities and assemblymen through the distribution of patronage. Quércia became the undisputed master of the São Paulo PMDB and handpicked the next gubernatorial candidate, Luiz Antônio Fleury Filho, a political unknown who had served as Secretary of Security in the state cabinet. After forcing the PMDB convention to ratify Fleury, Quércia wanted to be sure to elect his successor, and put the state machine to work in favor of his protégé.

The problems emerged when Fleury became governor. Fleury attempted to take over control of the party from Quércia's loyalists. Quércia successfully blocked Fleury's offensive,

but the two men had a severe falling out, and Fleury quit the party. His political career after leaving office was reduced to a less prestigious congressional seat for the PTB. This conflictual pattern has occurred again and again whenever insider proxies become too comfortable with power and attempt to supplant their political godfathers. When Anthony Garotinho, a proxy for the PDT's Leonel Brizola in Rio de Janeiro, won the governorship and then tried to wrest control of the state party machine, he too was forced out by Brizola. But Garotinho had the last laugh, switching to the PSB and becoming a powerful, popular governor in 1998-2002. Politically, he eclipsed his legendary mentor, who died in 2004. In 2002, when stepping down to run for president, Garotinho was able to find a more reliable insider proxy for himself than he had been for Brizola. Garotinho nominated his wife Rosinha to the governorship, which she won easily. He currently serves in her cabinet.

Oligarchy proxies. As the name suggests, this type of candidates is common in the “oligarchical states.” We distinguish this type from the “insider proxy” due to the fact that in this case, successful candidates have less incentive to defect, that is, to turn against their *padrinhos*. As discussed above, party machine bosses have tight control of one party machine so that one person dominates the selectorate. He appoints the candidate that best suits his wishes. In oligarchical states, the criterion for gubernatorial nomination is often shared DNA—but when blood is unavailable, loyalty will have to do.

Like insider proxies, oligarchy proxies are chosen primarily for their trustworthiness and at times have no previous significant political careers. The main difference comes from the incentives the latter type of candidate has to comply with the wishes of the oligarchical leader who appointed him or her. Subservience is a key job qualification. As discussed above, in oligarchical states one personal clique controls the state apparatus and has strong influence in all spheres of political life. The oligarchy bases its power on clientelistic relationships. Even when the ruling oligarch loses elections, he manages to keep control of important political resources due to the personal sway he holds over many congressmen, mayors and allies he has infiltrated throughout the state apparatus.¹⁵ Typically, his group enjoys significant economic power in the state too. Therefore, other things being equal, proxies of oligarchs are more pliant than proxies of party insiders. Oligarchy proxies have few incentives to defy the ruling clan, although it occasionally happens.

¹⁵ We are using masculine pronouns intentionally.

Souza (1997) labels this kind of nominees “technocrats-turned-politicians.” She recounts the emergence of Antônio Carlos Magalhães (ACM) as the preeminent *coronel* of Bahian politics. For the past two decades, the vast majority of the federal legislators elected by the PFL of Bahia have been former cabinet secretaries in ACM’s various administrations. Yet, Souza recounts instances when ACM’s appointees tried to undermine his power. In all cases, they failed and were relegated to second-rank political careers. Meanwhile, ACM successfully paved the way for his son Luís Eduardo to be elected governor in 1994. The political influence of oligarchical leaders is perhaps best summarized by the 1998 campaign motto of Paulo Souto, a technocrat-turned-politician, in his successful run for the governorship of Bahia. His slogan was simply: “Paulo Souto, ACM’s candidate!”

Free-wheeling independents at the state level. Nomination processes can be very contentious. In many cases, gubernatorial hopefuls are denied a spot on the ticket. This often results from a clash of local heavyweights. Since the electoral rules in Brazil are not very restrictive regarding party switching, politicians who are denied nomination are inclined to search for another party that will sponsor their candidacy.

Thus, many FWIs at the state level in Brazil are former governors, mayors, or senators longing to return to executive office. When their old pathway to power is blocked, they seek an alternative nomination. The case of Garotinho in Rio de Janeiro is emblematic; knowing he could not be renominated by his own party, he quit and joined another. Former governor Waldir Pires (PMDB) of Bahia—the one exception to ACM’s domination of the state since 1970—could not find a way back into his own party and joined the PT. Former governor Hélio Garcia of Minas Gerais lost control of his own party, the PMDB, and formed a new party, the PRS (existing only in Minas), which lasted only long enough to get him reelected to the governorship in 1990. Perennial candidates Álvaro Dias, Jaime Lerner, and Affonso Camargo have all changed parties several times in bids to recapture the governorship of Paraná, which they have all held at one time or another. Governor of the Federal District Joaquim Roriz has changed parties five times over the past 15 years, and has been elected to the governorship three times on three different party labels. In the case of Garcia, Dias, Roriz, and others, what matters is not the party label but the existence of an established political machine organized around an ex-governor.

The experience of FWIs at the state level shows that getting elected to a governorship only once is a transformative experience. Politicians are elevated into a new caste. From that point onward, they are likely to remain players in their states for a long time. As Table 6 shows, fully 15% of all gubernatorial candidates are ex-governors, but this is misleading because the universe includes many hopeless candidacies. If we were to consider only politically viable candidacies, the proportion of ex-governors would be somewhere from one third to one half. The experience of executive power is one that the ex-governors are likely to want to repeat. From that point on, the party systems of their states are likely to adapt to their necessities, and not the other way around.

[TABLE 6]

In sum, the governorship is enormously magnetic. Several Brazilian presidents—Quadros, Collor, and Itamar Franco—have chosen to run for their state governorships *after* leaving the Palácio do Planalto. Of the three, none had any strong ties to political parties, and only Itamar was successful.

Discussion and Conclusions

Brazil is a political system that is dominated by executives from top to bottom. In national politics, the president and his/her ministers predominate; in the states, power is centered on the state governor; and within the municipalities, the *prefeito* reigns supreme (our exclusion of municipal executives leaves out an important part of the picture here). This is not to say that legislators are unimportant: recent scholarship, especially that of Figueiredo and Limongi (1999), has shown the opposite to be true. But it also true that most legislators would prefer to be executives. Any study of political recruitment should focus on what politicians want to be when they grow up.

Here we have focused our efforts on presidents, ministers, and governors. The study of presidents was hampered by the fact that there have been only eleven modern presidents under democratic conditions, and of these, three (Goulart, Sarney, and Itamar) were elected only to the vice presidency. Two of the others were a former dictator and his Minister of War (Vargas and Dutra, respectively). One president (Neves) was not elected directly and never served. This leaves us only five individuals (Kubitschek, Quadros, Collor, Cardoso, and Lula) who were recruited by “normal” procedures of candidate selection and went on to win the presidency in

direct elections. Clearly, the sample does not allow much inference. But of the five latter individuals, three of them (Kubitschek, Quadros, and Collor) had served both as the governor of their state and earlier as the mayor of its capital city. Cardoso had held two cabinet portfolios: Foreign Relations and the all-important Finance Ministry. Executives beget executives.

Lula is the first president with legislative experience and no prior executive experience. But that does not mean that Lula is or was a “congressional insider.” He has run in six elections, five times for executive positions, and ran for Congress only once—in 1986, against his wishes. The career choices of prominent Brazilian politicians illustrate a clear career ladder, and all the important rungs on the ladder are executive posts.

Cabinet ministries are an important stop along the way. Five modern Brazilian presidents have previously been ministers. The cabinet holds out hope for many politicians, since there is a large number of ministries and a lot of public money to spend. For example, José Sarney had a cabinet of 23 ministries, in which more than 70 different individuals served during his five years in the presidential palace. Assuming that most of those individuals left on good terms with the president, that is a lot of political IOUs that can be called in later. Not surprisingly, Sarney was estimated to have “controlled” more than 50 votes in Congress after leaving the presidency. But several factors make recruitment to the cabinet somewhat ad hoc and randomized. Presidents are under increasing pressure to award key ministries to technocrats and apolitical professionals. Moreover, the pattern of shifting legislative alliances under *presidencialismo de coalizão* means that no one’s tenure is ever secure. The game of managing ministerial appointments is complicated. Currently, ten parties in Congress support Lula, and the presidential chief of staff—José Dirceu, a longtime party insider—is given the task of doling out appointments and keeping them all in line. A good deal of Brazilian macropolitics is explained by this single allocative function: an executive doling out executive power.

Governorships are perhaps the most interesting executive posts in Brazil, since they reveal so much about the crucial role of state-level and local politics. We drew attention to two variables that explain recruitment to the governorship. First, crucial differences between ideological and catch-all parties in Brazil favor different types of candidacies. Gubernatorial nominees of ideological parties are always party insiders, but under certain conditions nominees of catch-all parties can be insiders as well. A key observation is that free-wheeling independents are only viable in the latter type of party. Second, the uneven development of Brazil has created

states with vastly different environmental characteristics. By definition, oligarchical states have a predictably narrow range of viable gubernatorial candidates. In more competitive states, politicians can make their careers by attaching themselves to parties rather than to clans.

After discussing these two institutional variables, we turned to the construction of four ideal types of gubernatorial nominees. They were: party insiders, insider proxies, oligarchy proxies, and free-wheeling independents. In accordance with our framework, these four types of politicians are the result of the characteristics of the party they belong, the degree of competitiveness of the electoral game in the state under consideration, and the personal ambitions of candidates.

We find that proxy candidacies in Brazil are common. Of the two types, the insider proxy is a riskier bet than the oligarchy proxy. Living in a relatively freer political market, the insider proxy may attempt either to take over an existing party or move to a new one. Sometimes this strategy fails (Fleury) and sometimes it succeeds (Garotinho). In contrast, the oligarchy proxy is less likely to defect. The reason for this is that oligarchy is quasi-totalizing, in the sense that the ruling clique dominates not only political power but also economic power and media access. In such a state, it is *very* unpleasant to have a falling out with the dominant oligarch: one can be frozen out of public life altogether. As Victor Nunes Leal wrote about *coronelismo* more than 50 years ago, “The position of the local leader in opposition is so uncomfortable that, as a general rule, he only remains in opposition when he is unable to attach himself to the government” (Leal 1977: 19).

Our depiction of the Brazilian selection processes reveals an elitist and non-participatory system. The recent adoption of primaries by the PT is the exception that proves the rule: unlike some of the other cases discussed in this volume, there has been no demonstration effect spreading primaries from party to party. Nor has there been much popular or journalistic pressure for the adoption of primaries, despite the widespread suspicion of parties and politicians in Brazil. The weakness of the Brazilian party system results in part from hyperpresidentialism at the state level: the existence of powerful governorships (Abrucio 1998). The independence that governors have in relation to any higher authority, be it the president or state-level mechanisms of checks and balances, perpetuates the dynamics of traditional politics. In conclusion, access to the most powerful political positions in Brazil are generally controlled by

autonomous state-level party sections that have little connection or loyalty to national organizations.

References

- Abranches, Sérgio. 1988. "Presidencialismo de coalizão: o dilema institucional brasileiro." *Dados* 31, no. 1: 5-38.
- Abrucio, Fernando. 1998. *Os barões da Federação*. Sao Paulo: Hucitec.
- Abrucio, Fernando and David Samuels. 2000. "Federalism and Democratic Transitions: the 'New' Politics of Governors in Brazil." *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 30, no. 2 (Fall): 43-61.
- Ames, Barry. 2001. *The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Ames, Barry. 2002. "Party Discipline in the Chamber of Deputies." Pp. 185-221 in Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif, eds., *Legislative politics in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Amorim Neto, Octávio. 2002. "Presidential Cabinets, Electoral Cycles, and Coalition Discipline in Brazil." In Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif, eds., *Legislative Politics in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Black, Gordon. 1972. "A Theory of Political Ambition: Career Choices and the Role of Structural Incentives." *American Political Science Review* 66 (1): 144-159.
- Cintra, Antônio Octávio. 1979. "Traditional Brazilian Politics: An Interpretation of Relations between Center and Periphery." In Neuma Aguiar, ed., *The Structure of Brazilian Development*, pp. 127-166. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.
- Figueiredo, Argelina, and Fernando Limongi. 1999. *Executivo e legislativo na nova ordem constitucional*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Fundação Getúlio Vargas.
- Guzmán, Carlos Enrique, and Ermicio Sena de Oliveira. 2001. "Brasil." In Manuel Alcántara Sáez and Flavia Freidenberg, eds., *Partidos políticos de América Latina: Cono Sur*. Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca.
- Hagopian, Frances. 1996. *Traditional Politics and Regime Change in Brazil*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Jones, Mark P. 1999. "Electoral Laws and the Effective Number of Candidates in Presidential Elections." *Journal of Politics* 61, no. 1 (February): 171-184.
- Jones, Mark P., and Scott Mainwaring. 2003. "The Nationalization of Parties and Party Systems: An Empirical Measure with Application to the Americas." *Party Politics*, 9 (2), 139-66.

- Leal, Victor Nunes. 1977. *Coronelismo: The Municipality and Representative Government in Brazil*, trans. June Henfrey. London: Cambridge University Press. Originally published in Portuguese in 1948.
- Mainwaring, Scott. 1999. *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Meneguello, Rachel. 1998. *Partidos e governos no Brasil contemporâneo (1985-1997)*. São Paulo: Paz e Terra.
- Nunes, Edson de Oliveira. 1978. "Legislativo, política e recrutamento de elites no Brasil." *Dados* no. 17, pp. 53-78.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1973. *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Payne, Leigh A. 2000. *Uncivil Movements: The Armed Right Wing and Democracy in Latin America*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Porto, Mauro P. 2003. "Mass Media and Politics in Democratic Brazil." In Maria D'Alva Gil Kinzo and James Dunkerley, eds., *Brazil since 1985: Politics, Economy, and Society*. London: Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London.
- Power, Timothy J. 2000. *The Political Right in Postauthoritarian Brazil: Elites, Institutions, and Democratization*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Power, Timothy J. 2001-2002. "Blairism Brazilian Style? Cardoso and the 'Third Way' in Brazil." *Political Science Quarterly* 116, no. 4 (Winter): 611-636.
- Power, Timothy J., and Mahrukh Doctor. 2004. "Another Century of Corporatism? Continuity and Change in Brazilian Corporatist Structures." In Howard J. Wiarda, ed., *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America, Revisited*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Rohde, David. 1979. "Risk-Bearing and Progressive Ambition: The Case of the United States House of Representatives." *American Journal of Political Science* 23 (February): 1-23.
- Samuels, David. 2003. *Ambition, Federalism, and Legislative Politics in Brazil*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Schmitt, Rogério. 2003. "A nacionalização dos partidos políticos brasileiros." In José Antonio Giusti Tavares, ed., *O sistema partidário na consolidação da democracia brasileira*. Porto Alegre: Nova Prova Editora.

- Soares, Gláucio Ary Dillon. 1967. "The Politics of Uneven Development: The Case of Brazil." In Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*. New York: The Free Press.
- Souza, Celina. 1997. *Constitutional Engineering in Brazil: The Politics of Federalism and Decentralization*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Weyland, Kurt. 1993. "The Rise and Fall of President Collor and Its Impact on Brazilian Democracy." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 35, no. 1 (Spring): 1-36.

Table 1: Prior political experience of presidents in the two democratic periods, 1946-1964 and 1985-2003 (number of terms)

President	City Council	Mayor or Vice Mayor	State Legislator	Governor or Vice-Governor	Federal Deputy	Senator	Minister	Prime Minister	Vice-President	Total years in office
Dutra							1			9
Vargas*			2	1	2		1			40
Kubitschek		1		1	2					15
Quadros	1	1	1	1	1					12
Goulart			1		1		1		2	12
Neves**			1	1	5	1	1	1		33
Samuel				1	2	2			1	26
Collor		1		1	1					10
Franco		2				2			1	19
Cardoso						2	2			11
Lula da Silva***					1					4

* Total years in office prior to being elected president. Vargas occupied the presidency from 1930-1945, but after 1934 elections were not held. Vargas became president by democratic channels only in 1950.

** Neves was elected to the presidency in 1985 but died prior to taking office. Earlier, he was one of the two prime ministers during Brazil's brief experiment with semipresidentialism, September 1961-January 1963.

*** The current term of Lula extends from January 1, 2003 to January 1, 2007.

Table 2: Perceived importance of ministerial portfolios, federal legislators, 1990

Ministry	Spontaneous mentions	Percent
Agriculture	54	24.4
Interior*	53	24.0
Finance	32	14.5
Education	27	12.2
Transportation	14	6.3
Mines and Energy	11	5.0
Industry and Commerce	8	3.6
Health	5	2.3
Social Security	4	1.8
SEPLAN (Planning)	3	1.4
Communications	2	0.9
Science and Technology	1	0.5
Justice	1	0.5
TOTALS	221	100.0

Open-ended question for write-in answers: *Se o Sr. tivesse que escolher um Ministério federal que é da maior importancia para seu estado ou região, qual seria? (Por favor escreva o nome de um dos 23 ministérios que existiram durante o governo Sarney.)* “If you had to choose a federal ministry that is of the highest importance for your state or region, which one would it be? Please write in the name of one of the 23 ministries that existed during the Sarney administration.”

*Today known as Regional Integration.

N=249. Some 22 did not answer, and 6 gave invalid responses. Only valid responses shown.

Respondents cited 13 of 23 possible ministries.

Source: Mail survey by Power, 1990.

Table 3: Legislative experience of nonmilitary permanent ministers per administration in three periods, 1946-1964, 1965-1978, and 1995-2004 (in percent)

Origin Administration	Legislative Experience	Military* Experience	Other**	Technical Bureaucrac y	No info	N
Dutra	52	4	20	4	20	25
Vargas	75	-	25	-	-	20
Café Filho	50	4.5	36.5	4.5	4.5	22
Kubitscheck	65	4.4	30.4	-	-	23
Quadros	60	-	10	-	30	10
Goulart	59.7	-	25	5.7	9.6	52
<i>Totals 1945-1964</i>	59.9	2.0	25.7	3.3	9.2	152
Castelo Branco	35.7	3.6	42.8	10.7	7.2	28
Costa e Silva	37.5	12.5	50	-	-	16
Medici	18.7	12.5	68.7	-	-	16
Geisel	20	20	53.3	6.7	-	15
<i>Totals 1965-1978</i>	29.3	10.7	52.0	5.3	2.7	75
Cardoso 1	44.4	-	13.8	41.7	-	36
Cardoso 2	32.7	-	13.5	36.5	17.3	52
Lula	62.5	-	25	12.5	-	24
<i>Totals 1995-2004</i>	44.1	-	16.5	32.1	7.3	109

Source: First and second periods from Nunes (1978). Third period calculated by authors.

* Ministers of the armed service branches (army, navy, air force, etc.) are excluded from this analysis. This column refers to ministers in nonmilitary portfolios who had military experience.

** The category 'other' includes businessmen, diplomats, mayors, union leaders etc.

Table 4: Pathways to gubernatorial office in three periods

Pathways	First Period 1946-1962		Second Period 1965-1974		Third Period 1986-2002		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Legislatures*	66	69	42	64	106	77.9	213	72
Other channels	16	17	21	33	30	22.1	68	23
No info	13	14	2	3	--	--	15	5
Total	95	100	65	100	136	100	296	100

Source: First and second periods from Nunes (1978). Third period calculated by authors.

*Legislatures include both state assemblies and the national legislature.

All governors that were elected are included plus the vice-governors that took office because of death of the elected governor. Due to reelection, both in the following term as allowed beginning in the 1998 elections, and previously with a period or more out of office, some governors were included more than once.

Table 5: Partisan Affiliations of Gubernatorial Candidates, 1990-2002

<i>Party</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>%</i>
Small Right	151	24.8
PT	81	13.3
PMDB	71	11.6
PSDB	48	7.9
PDS/PPR/PPB	48	7.9
Small Left	42	6.9
PDT	42	6.9
PFL	38	6.2
PSB	34	5.6
PTB	20	3.3
PCB/PPS	11	1.8
PRN	11	1.8
PL	7	1.1
PDC	5	0.8
PC do B	1	0.2
TOTALS	610	100.0

Source: compiled by authors from TSE data.

Table 6: Other Characteristics of Gubernatorial Candidates, 1990-2002

<i>Candidate Characteristics</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>%</i>
Had previously served as governor	94	15.4
Won victory outright in first round	51	8.4
Advanced to a runoff election	116	19.0
Female	53	8.7
From a less developed state	381	62.5
TOTALS	610	100.0

Source: compiled by authors from TSE data.